By Sarah Katherine Sisk   February 18, 2026

A new report has identified at least 21 Chinese nationals working in U.S. universities and federally funded labs whose backgrounds make them “a likely asset to the Chinese Communist Party.” The shocking development raises immediate national security concerns as evidence mounts that Beijing is using access to U.S. taxpayer-funded research to advance its military capabilities and erode America’s economic edge.

The report, released by the American Accountability Foundation (AAF), describes “specific and serious national security threats posed by the universities’ persistent recruitment of research associates and postdoctoral fellows under the J-1 Visa Program.”

The J-1 Visa Program is a non-immigrant U.S. visa administered by the State Department that allows foreign nationals to enter the United States temporarily to participate in approved cultural exchange programs – such as study, research, teaching, internships, au pair work, and medical training. It is intended to promote mutual understanding between Americans and people from other countries, but there are growing fears that the CCP and other U.S. adversaries are abusing the program to harm the United States, including by inserting foreign government operatives to funnel cutting-edge research back to their home countries.

AAF says it began examining what it calls the “infiltration of the United States research enterprise” by scientists from China. The report does not accuse the researchers of outright, intentional espionage, but rather makes a narrower claim that U.S. tax dollars fund sensitive military-related research that remains open to foreign scholars with documented ties to the CCP.

“The reports attached present twenty-one individuals who, because of the dual-use threat of their research, close ties to the military research sector in China, and/or clear ties to the Chinese Communist Party, should be expelled from the United States or never be re-admitted,” a summary memo states.

AAF began by reviewing researchers at universities with military labs, top federal research funding recipients, Ivy League schools, and national laboratories. From roughly 10,000 individuals, it narrowed its focus to those working in “hard sciences with obvious national security/homeland security applications.” It also conducted parallel research on individuals whose backgrounds or activities raised concerns.

Among the 21 names listed, several cases illustrate a disturbing pattern.

One individual, a postdoctoral researcher at Brown University, previously served as a CCP Party branch secretary in China. She now works in a lab supported by multiple U.S. military research offices – meaning that a former CCP official is conducting research funded by American defense agencies.

Another Chinese national, now at Purdue University, previously worked at HPSTAR, an institute placed on the U.S. Commerce Department’s Entity List for activities “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” Her work supports technologies such as advanced sensors and quantum systems, and the labs where she has worked receive Army and Navy research funding.

Jingao Xu, a J-1 visa holder at Carnegie Mellon University, works on drone-based computing — technology with clear battlefield implications. He has publicly praised the CCP leadership while working in a lab funded by the U.S. Army and Navy.

Yingkai Dong, a research fellow at Harvard University, studies exoskeleton systems designed to enhance soldier performance on the battlefield. Army publications describe such systems as potentially transformative for the future of warfare. Dong is identified as a CCP probationary member.

Zongliang Xie works at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California on advanced materials used in high-power radar and missile-related systems. His research is supported by federal agencies, including the Department of Energy and the Air Force.

The report also profiles Chunyin Zhu, a postdoctoral researcher at Indiana University and a senior member of a CCP-affiliated party. Images in the report show Zhu posing next to a hammer and sickle during Party activities.

Most of the researchers named in the report are engaged in “fundamental research” — Pentagon-funded but unclassified work, since foreign nationals are generally ineligible for security clearances. AAF’s concern is that dual-use research, professional networks, and export control gaps could allow knowledge to flow outward — including what it describes as the potential to “transfer technology and research to the People’s Liberation Army.”

In a section titled “Next Steps,” AAF argues the problem may extend beyond J-1 visas.

“As this research shows, America has a serious problem with the Chinese Communist Party exploiting the U.S. university system,” the report states. It adds that “Chinese nationals, with the acquiescence of university leadership, have taken over significant portions of the research infrastructure of university research departments.”

Many of the individuals identified were hired by lab directors “likely on an H-1B visa,” and “many labs are led and dominated by Chinese nationals.” The group calls scrutiny of H-1B participation in sensitive research a “significant next step.”

The policy questions are obvious. Should dual-use research fields require security clearances? Should visa screening include a deeper review of CCP ties? Should defense-funded research require U.S. citizenship?

AF’s report is not a call to end scientific exchange. Rather, it is a plea for policymakers to recognize that China treats research theft as part of its national defense strategy – and to respond accordingly with stronger protections against it.

Sarah Katherine Sisk is a proud Hillsdale College alumna and a master’s student in economics at George Mason University. You can follow her on X @SKSisk76.