- APRIL 13, 2010
Editor’s Note: Last week, the Obama administration began to unveil its new nuclear strategy. We asked six former U.S. foreign policy officials to reflect on the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, and whether Mr. Obama’s emerging nuclear doctrine is a move in the right direction.
President Barack Obama shares President Ronald Reagan’s desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons. He also shares Reagan’s conviction that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must maintain its deterrent capability through a stockpile of nuclear weapons that are secure, safe and reliable.
Last week saw two major and related developments: the release of a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia. The new treaty calls for modest but significant reductions in strategic weapons, accompanied by verification and transparency measures made necessary by the expiration of the original START last December.
The treaty helps move our relationship with Russia in a more constructive direction, and it sets the stage for work with other nations in getting the nuclear threat under control. The NPR is especially interesting in its broad invitation to other countries to work with the United States on strategic issues, and in its recognition of the importance of addressing regional disputes.
The NPR carefully calibrates the circumstances when states might face the use of nuclear weapons to “defend the vital interests of the United States, our allies and partners.” States are encouraged to be non-nuclear by assurances that we would not use nuclear weapons against them.
The document recognizes that deterrence is not necessarily strengthened by overreliance on nuclear weapons. These weapons have not been used since 1945 and successive presidents have shown little appetite for using them except as a last resort. Instead, deterrence can be strengthened through more effective intelligence and through precision in the targeting of conventional weapons. We also have the capacity to target those individuals who might authorize the use of weapons of mass destruction. This 21st century version of deterrence is more relevant than one that is over-reliant on weapons that indiscriminately destroy large numbers of innocents.
Both documents are invitations to future work, and there is plenty to do if we are to maintain our safety and security.
Mr. Shultz, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989.
The end of the Cold War reduced both the danger of a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange and the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. In 1991, the U.S. had approximately 10,000 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Last year, the U.S. cut that number to just over 2,000 under the Moscow Treaty signed by President George W. Bush in 2002. The relatively modest additional reductions agreed to by Presidents Obama and Medvedev do little to change that fundamental picture.
What has changed fundamentally is the likelihood that nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of irresponsible rulers, or terrorists who can’t be deterred at all. Unfortunately, President Obama’s talk about a world free of nuclear weapons seems to have little connection to the passive U.S. responses to North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear activities.
There is certainly room for additional reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, but it is unlikely to have any effect on those countries. Indeed, if the new treaty constrains U.S. missile defense efforts, it could be counterproductive. Although President Reagan wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons—believing it dangerous to rely indefinitely on a balance of nuclear terror— when Mikhail Gorbachev offered to eliminate ballistic missiles in exchange for eliminating missile defenses, Reagan refused the deal.
To be serious about a world without nuclear weapons, we must face some serious questions—questions that have nothing to do with U.S. or Russian numbers:
Is the U.S. doing enough to develop effective missile defenses? How can we prevent the language in the treaty’s preamble—linking offensive and defensive weapons—from blocking more ambitious U.S. missile defense efforts in the future?
What will the administration do to counter Iran’s nuclear program if sanctions prove no more effective than engagement? What about North Korea? Is there no way to peacefully promote more responsible leadership in either country?
What are we doing to preserve the safety and reliability of our diminishing number of nuclear weapons?
Since we are reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, how can we strengthen our conventional deterrent in the face of determined efforts to deny us nearby basing options?
Twenty one years ago, when the SALT II Treaty was signed, Sen. Sam Nunn (D., Ga.) believed that the most important way to reduce the danger of nuclear war was to improve U.S. conventional deterrence, and he made that a condition for Senate ratification of the treaty. Similarly, the new treaty provides an opportunity to question whether we are doing enough to confront the danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists and irresponsible regimes.
Mr. Wolfowitz, a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, served as deputy U.S. secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration.
We owe a substantial debt to the Department of Defense and to the military commands for fending off some of the wilder views within the administration and elsewhere. The Nuclear Posture Review indicates that a sizeable U.S. nuclear deterrent will remain essential for the foreseeable future; it sustains the nuclear triad (submarines, land-based missiles and bombers); it fully embraces the concept of extended deterrence (providing a shield over our allies); and it establishes the principle that any strategic force reductions would not be unilateral (Russia must come down to the same extent).
Despite the expected hoopla about this so-called landmark agreement, the actual reductions are quite modest. President Obama had promised during the campaign quickly to come down to the lower limit of 1,700 warheads specified in the Moscow Treaty of 2002. So the negotiated level of 1,550 warheads represents only a further reduction of 150.
We will, of course, need to be concerned about negotiations planned for the future, but this level appears to be adequate. The Senate will need to inquire into the rationale for the agreement on only 700 launchers included in the new START treaty. Still, the biggest concern will remain over the massive stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons that Russia will retain, and about which it has refused to negotiate.
The attempt to better define the circumstances under which we might employ nuclear weapons is a more questionable adjustment. It departs from the present policy of calculated ambiguity. The administration did reject the pleas on the part of arms-controls advocates and liberals on the Hill for “no first use.” To state, however, that we will only use nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed states does provide some psychological impediment to nuclear proliferation and does have unquestioned diplomatic advantages.
On the other hand, it undoubtedly provides an incentive for other states, such as Syria, to focus on biological weapons as their WMD of choice (the United States years ago renounced both biological and chemical weapons). What the Israelis, for instance, will make of this narrowing of potential targets will be interesting. It certainly won’t encourage them to abandon their reported nuclear deterrent, especially since our relationship is somewhat touchy at the moment. In addition, since the U.S. indicates it might target nations not in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Israelis won’t be any more inclined to join, as the administration has urged them to do. (Israel is not out of compliance with the NPT, since it has never joined.)
Such ironies are inevitable when one attempts to define declaratory policy with greater precision. But, happily, the administration’s nuclear posture has turned out to be far more reassuring than its rhetoric.
Mr. Schlesinger was secretary of defense from 1973 to 1975.
Negotiating arms control with Russia is a multifaceted task. Reaching agreement on treaties that limit the number of weapons, missiles and bombers absorbs most of the time.
Yet this hassle over numbers is not necessarily the most important issue. The overarching question is how these numbers of weapons and delivery systems will be employed. Do we know which policy and what kind of strategy will determine the use of nuclear weapons?
We must keep in mind that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. A tradition against the use of such weapons now dominates all aspects of nuclear policy. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear-armed nations fighting a war against a country that did not have a single nuclear bomb accepted a stalemate or defeat rather than winning the war by using nuclear strength. This was the case in the Korean War, the U.S. war in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan.
In the next arms-control negotiations, preserving the nonuse of nuclear weapons will be the most important requirement. If nuclear weapons are used again, the consequences will be cataclysmic. Nuclear proliferation could not be averted, the barrier between conventional and nuclear weapons would be obliterated, and the treaties limiting nuclear weapons would not be kept. The tradition of nonuse would end if terrorists obtain nuclear weapons and use them. President Obama correctly emphasized the threat of nuclear terrorism.
The Obama administration’s emerging nuclear policy also highlights the danger of an accidental launch of a nuclear missile. It has been reported that U.S. missiles have programming safeguards in case of a launch not authorized by the proper military authority. But other measures are also needed. The crisis hotline should be updated technologically. And a joint Russia-U.S. Warning Center, which has been discussed between American and Russian diplomats, should be established that could provide both sides with solid information about a possible alert or attack.
Disagreements about missile defense will continue between Russia and the U.S. Russian arms-control experts already worry about the regional missile shield proposed by President Obama. The Obama administration should not repeat the mistakes of the last administration on Iran—the Bush administration assumed that Iran had ballistic missiles but ignored Iran’s cruise missiles, against which we would need a different kind of defense.
Also, we should not forget the role of deterrence. The Iranian government should not be allowed to assume that after an Iranian missile attack on Eastern Europe we would simply send a diplomatic note to Tehran saying “that was nasty—don’t do it again.”
Mr. Iklé was the undersecretary of defense for policy during the Reagan administration.
One year ago, President Obama told a Prague audience that, “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy . . . .”
Yet last week, the president (a) signed an arms-control agreement with Russia that is a nearly perfect example of Cold War thinking; (b) announced a nuclear-weapons doctrine that does almost nothing to reduce the role of these weapons in a largely unchanged national security strategy; and (c) moved to abandon or diminish essential modernization of our aging arsenal. This is a dangerous, short-sighted policy that rejects or marginalizes the most urgent recommendations of the William Perry-James Schlesinger 2009 bilateral commission on nuclear forces.
With the new START treaty, the administration has continued the now senseless practice of fixing the size and character of our nuclear forces not by analyzing what is necessary for our security, but by reaching a bilateral treaty with Russia. This is exactly what we did during the Cold War when the most important issue facing our nuclear deterrent was whether its size and character was adequate to deter the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
But no one believes the threat we face today comes from Russia’s arsenal. It simply does not matter how many weapons Russia has.
What does matter, as we face increasing danger from nuclear powers like North Korea now, and Iran all too soon, is whether we have the right forces for our defense. This includes defensive as well as offensive weapons.
To the degree that an otherwise unimportant Cold War relic like the new START treaty limits our freedom to optimize our defenses, it will diminish rather than increase our safety. In this regard, Vladimir Putin’s threat to abandon the treaty if he doesn’t like our defensive forces is troubling. Militarily, it wouldn’t matter if Russia withdrew from the treaty. But Mr. Putin could gain powerful leverage by threatening to do so since Mr. Obama has hyped the treaty’s importance, claiming, without a shred of evidence, that it will restrain the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
Ironically, the president’s exaggerated claims for the new treaty may be just the opening that thoughtful senators like Jon Kyl need to overcome the administration’s lackadaisical attitude toward achieving a force that is secure, safe and reliable. Mr. Kyl is demanding an adequately funded program to implement the Perry-Schlesinger nuclear recommendations—especially the development of a warhead to replace our most antiquated weapons, and modernization of our weapons laboratories—as a condition for ratifying the treaty. And he has enough senators supporting him to make it happen.
Not a bad trade: A treaty of little consequence for a safe, secure and reliable deterrent that may actually make us safer.
Mr. Perle, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was assistant secretary of defense responsible for arms control during the Reagan administration.
The Goal Remains
Nuclear ‘Zero’
The Obama administration’s nuclear posture review, together with the new START treaty with Russia, will strengthen American security and reinforce the nation’s global leadership. This is an impressive achievement for at least four reasons.
First, each of these initiatives (along with this week’s nuclear security summit) are modest and incremental steps toward reducing the nuclear threat. But taken together, their impact could be transformational, spurring a shift in American nuclear strategy from an outmoded Cold War focus on deterring a Russian-American nuclear conflict to a 21st century emphasis on curbing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Such a shift is long overdue, and opens the door to new opportunities for further international cooperation, with Russia, China and others to reduce nuclear risks.
Second, the posture review represents a necessary de-emphasis in the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and foreign policy. The review confirms that the administration will not develop or deploy a new generation of warheads and announces that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that adhere to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. These steps will strengthen President Obama’s hand in re-energizing international support for enhanced nonproliferation measures while raising the costs for any country, such as Iran, that positions itself as a nuclear renegade.
Third, while the START treaty does not mandate drastic cuts in Russian and U.S. strategic forces, as the president made clear in the posture review, this is only the first step in a longer-term process. In the next phase of negotiations, the administration will seek deeper cuts in overall numbers of weapons (strategic and tactical, deployed and stored), which could pave the way for bringing other nuclear powers like China, India and Pakistan into the negotiations.
Fourth and finally, despite the scoffing of hardliner cynics, Mr. Obama, as he said last week in Prague, has not abandoned his long-term goal of Global Zero: the elimination of all nuclear weapons world-wide. Thus, all of his nuclear initiatives seem designed to build a platform for pursuing this effort. This is strategically sound politics: The American public is coming to understand that in an era when nuclear arms know-how and technology are increasingly available around the world, nuclear weapons don’t serve the interests of the United States, but those of rogue nations, failing states and terrorists.
Mr. Burt was the chief U.S. negotiator of the START I treaty and is chairman of Global Zero, USA. He also serves as a managing director of McLarty Associates.
